Improving the Security of Industrial Networks by Means of Formal Verification (Articolo in rivista)

Type
Label
  • Improving the Security of Industrial Networks by Means of Formal Verification (Articolo in rivista) (literal)
Anno
  • 2007-01-01T00:00:00+01:00 (literal)
Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#doi
  • 10.1016/j.csi.2006.06.002 (literal)
Alternative label
  • I. Cibrario Bertolotti; L. Durante; P. Maggi; R. Sisto; A. Valenzano (2007)
    Improving the Security of Industrial Networks by Means of Formal Verification
    in Computer standards & interfaces; Elsevier BV, Amsterdam (Paesi Bassi)
    (literal)
Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#autori
  • I. Cibrario Bertolotti; L. Durante; P. Maggi; R. Sisto; A. Valenzano (literal)
Pagina inizio
  • 387 (literal)
Pagina fine
  • 397 (literal)
Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#url
  • http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0920548906000766 (literal)
Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#numeroVolume
  • 29 (literal)
Rivista
Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#pagineTotali
  • 11 (literal)
Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#numeroFascicolo
  • 3 (literal)
Note
  • ISI Web of Science (WOS) (literal)
  • Google Scholar (literal)
  • Scopu (literal)
Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#affiliazioni
  • I. Cibrario Bertolotti; L. Durante; A. Valenzano: CNR-IEIIT, Istituto di Elettronica e di Ingegneria dell'Informazione e delle Telecomunicazioni, Torino, Italy P. Maggi; R. Sisto: Dipartimento di Automatica e Informatica, Politecnico di Torino, Torino, Italy (literal)
Titolo
  • Improving the Security of Industrial Networks by Means of Formal Verification (literal)
Abstract
  • Computer networks are exposed to serious security threats that can even have catastrophic consequences from both the points of view of economy and safety if such networks control critical infrastructures, such as for example industrial plants. Security must then be considered as a fundamental issue starting from the earlier phases of the design of a system, and suitable techniques and tools should be adopted to satisfy the security-related requirements. The focus of this paper is on how formal methods can help in analysing the standard cryptographic protocols used to implement security-critical services such as authentication and secret keys distribution in critical environments. The analysis of the 802.11 shared key authentication protocol by S(3)A, a fully automatic software tool that is based on a formal approach, is illustrated as a case study, which also highlights the peculiarities of analysing protocols based on wireless channels. (literal)
Editore
Prodotto di
Autore CNR
Insieme di parole chiave

Incoming links:


Prodotto
Autore CNR di
Editore di
Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#rivistaDi
Insieme di parole chiave di
data.CNR.it