http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/individuo/prodotto/ID83481
Formal analysis of some timed security properties in wireless protocols (Contributo in atti di convegno)
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- Label
- Formal analysis of some timed security properties in wireless protocols (Contributo in atti di convegno) (literal)
- Anno
- 2003-01-01T00:00:00+01:00 (literal)
- Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#doi
- 10.1007/978-3-540-39958-2_10 (literal)
- Alternative label
Gorrieri R., Martinelli F., Petrocchi M., Vaccarelli A. (2003)
Formal analysis of some timed security properties in wireless protocols
in Conference on Formal Methods for Open Object-based Distributed Systems FMOODS03, Parigi
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- Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#autori
- Gorrieri R., Martinelli F., Petrocchi M., Vaccarelli A. (literal)
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- Pagina fine
- Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#url
- http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-540-39958-2_10 (literal)
- Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#volumeInCollana
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- We show how a recent language for the description of cryptographic protocols in a real time setting may be suitable to formally
verify security aspects of wireless protocols. We define also a compositional
proof rule for establishing security properties of such protocols. The
effectiveness of our approach is shown by defining and studying the timed
integrity property for muTESLA, a well-known protocol for wireless sensor
networks. We are able to deal with a protocol specifications with an arbitrary
number of agents (senders as well as receivers) running the protocol.
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- Note
- ISI Web of Science (WOS) (literal)
- Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#affiliazioni
- 1 Università di Bologna; 2 IIT CNR , 3 IIT CNR, 4 IIT CNR (literal)
- Titolo
- Formal analysis of some timed security properties in wireless protocols (literal)
- Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#isbn
- 978-3-540-20491-6 (literal)
- Abstract
- We show how a recent language for the description of cryptographic protocols in a real time setting may be suitable to formally verify security aspects of wireless protocols. We define also a compositional proof rule for establishing security properties of such protocols. The effectiveness of our approach is shown by defining and studying the timed integrity property for ?TESLA, a well-known protocol for wireless sensor networks. We are able to deal with protocol specifications with an arbitrary number of agents (senders as well as receivers) running the protocol. (literal)
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