Formal analysis of some timed security properties in wireless protocols (Contributo in atti di convegno)

Type
Label
  • Formal analysis of some timed security properties in wireless protocols (Contributo in atti di convegno) (literal)
Anno
  • 2003-01-01T00:00:00+01:00 (literal)
Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#doi
  • 10.1007/978-3-540-39958-2_10 (literal)
Alternative label
  • Gorrieri R., Martinelli F., Petrocchi M., Vaccarelli A. (2003)
    Formal analysis of some timed security properties in wireless protocols
    in Conference on Formal Methods for Open Object-based Distributed Systems FMOODS03, Parigi
    (literal)
Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#autori
  • Gorrieri R., Martinelli F., Petrocchi M., Vaccarelli A. (literal)
Pagina inizio
  • 139 (literal)
Pagina fine
  • 154 (literal)
Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#url
  • http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-540-39958-2_10 (literal)
Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#volumeInCollana
  • 2884 (literal)
Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#descrizioneSinteticaDelProdotto
  • We show how a recent language for the description of cryptographic protocols in a real time setting may be suitable to formally verify security aspects of wireless protocols. We define also a compositional proof rule for establishing security properties of such protocols. The effectiveness of our approach is shown by defining and studying the timed integrity property for muTESLA, a well-known protocol for wireless sensor networks. We are able to deal with a protocol specifications with an arbitrary number of agents (senders as well as receivers) running the protocol. (literal)
Note
  • ISI Web of Science (WOS) (literal)
Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#affiliazioni
  • 1 Università di Bologna; 2 IIT CNR , 3 IIT CNR, 4 IIT CNR (literal)
Titolo
  • Formal analysis of some timed security properties in wireless protocols (literal)
Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#isbn
  • 978-3-540-20491-6 (literal)
Abstract
  • We show how a recent language for the description of cryptographic protocols in a real time setting may be suitable to formally verify security aspects of wireless protocols. We define also a compositional proof rule for establishing security properties of such protocols. The effectiveness of our approach is shown by defining and studying the timed integrity property for ?TESLA, a well-known protocol for wireless sensor networks. We are able to deal with protocol specifications with an arbitrary number of agents (senders as well as receivers) running the protocol. (literal)
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