Punishment and gossip: Sustaining cooperation in a Public Goods Game (Contributo in volume (capitolo o saggio))

Type

• Prodotto della ricerca (Classe)
• Contributo in volume (capitolo o saggio) (Classe)

Label

• Punishment and gossip: Sustaining cooperation in a Public Goods Game (Contributo in volume (capitolo o saggio)) (literal)

Anno

• 2014-01-01T00:00:00+01:00 (literal)

Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#doi

• 10.1007/978-3-642-39829-2_10 (literal)

Alternative label

• Giardini, Francesca; Paolucci, Mario; Villatoro, Daniel; Conte, Rosaria (2014)
  Punishment and gossip: Sustaining cooperation in a Public Goods Game
  in 9th Conference of the European Social Simulation Association, ESSA 2013, 2014
  (literal)

Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#autori

• Giardini, Francesca; Paolucci, Mario; Villatoro, Daniel; Conte, Rosaria (literal)

Pagina inizio

• 107 (literal)

Pagina fine

• 118 (literal)

Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#url

• http://www.scopus.com/record/display.url?eid=2-s2.0-84901005700&origin=inward (literal)

Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#titoloVolume

• 9th Conference of the European Social Simulation Association, ESSA 2013 (literal)

Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#volumeInCollana

• 229 AISC (literal)

Note

• Scopu (literal)

Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#affiliazioni

• ISTC-CNR, ISTC-CNR, CSIC - Instituto de Investigacion en Inteligencia Artificial (IIIA), ISTC-CNR (literal)

Titolo

• Punishment and gossip: Sustaining cooperation in a Public Goods Game (literal)

Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#isbn

• 9783642398285 (literal)

Abstract

• In an environment in which free-riders are better off than cooperators, social control is required to foster and maintain cooperation. There are two main paths through which social control can be applied: punishment and reputation. Our experiments explore the efficacy of punishment and reputation on cooperation rates, both in isolation and in combination. Using a Public Goods Game, we are interested in assessing how cooperation rates change when agents can play one of two different reactive strategies, i.e., they can pay a cost in order to reduce the payoff of free-riders, or they can know others' reputation and then either play defect with free-riders, or refuse to interact with them. Cooperation is maintained at a high level through punishment, but also reputation-based partner selection proves effective in maintaining cooperation. However, when agents are informed about free-riders' reputation and play Defect, cooperation decreases. Finally, a combination of punishment and reputation-based partner selection leads to higher cooperation rates. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014. (literal)

Prodotto di

• Institute of cognitive sciences and technologies (ISTC) (Istituto)
• Società artificiali e simulazione sociale (ICT.P11.014.001) (Modulo)

Autore CNR

• FRANCESCA GIARDINI (Persona)
• MARIO PAOLUCCI (Persona)
• ROSARIA CONTE (Unità di personale interno)

Insieme di parole chiave

• Keywords of "Punishment and gossip: Sustaining cooperation in a Public Goods Game" (Insieme di parole chiave)

Incoming links:

Autore CNR di

• MARIO PAOLUCCI (Persona)
• ROSARIA CONTE (Unità di personale interno)
• FRANCESCA GIARDINI (Persona)

Prodotto

• Institute of cognitive sciences and technologies (ISTC) (Istituto)
• Società artificiali e simulazione sociale (ICT.P11.014.001) (Modulo)

Insieme di parole chiave di

• Keywords of "Punishment and gossip: Sustaining cooperation in a Public Goods Game" (Insieme di parole chiave)