Securing mobile unattended WSNs against a mobile adversary (Contributo in atti di convegno)

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Label
  • Securing mobile unattended WSNs against a mobile adversary (Contributo in atti di convegno) (literal)
Anno
  • 2010-01-01T00:00:00+01:00 (literal)
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  • Di Pietro R.; Oligeri G.; Soriente C.; Tsudik G. (2010)
    Securing mobile unattended WSNs against a mobile adversary
    in SRDS 2010 - 29th IEEE Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems, New Delhi, India
    (literal)
Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#autori
  • Di Pietro R.; Oligeri G.; Soriente C.; Tsudik G. (literal)
Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#altreInformazioni
  • Codice Puma: cnr.isti/2010-A2-119 (literal)
Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#note
  • In: SRDS 2010 - 29th IEEE International Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (New Delhi, India, 9 November 2010). Proceedings, pp. 11 - 20. IEEE, 2010. Di Pietro R., Oligeri G., Soriente C., Tsudik G. Securing mobile unattended WSNs against a mobile adversary. In: SRDS 2010 - 29th IEEE Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (New Delhi, India, 31 October - 3 November 2010). Proceedings, pp. 11 - 20. IEEE, 2010. (literal)
Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#descrizioneSinteticaDelProdotto
  • ABSTRACT: One important factor complicating security inWireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) is lack of inexpensive tamperresistant hardware in commodity sensors. Once an adversary compromises a sensor, all memory and forms of storage become exposed, along with all secrets. Thereafter, any cryptographic remedy ceases to be effective. Regaining sensor security after compromise (i.e., intrusion-resilience) is a formidable challenge. Prior approaches rely on either (1) the presence of an on-line trusted third party (sink), or (2) the availability of a True Random Number Generator (TRNG) on each sensor. Neither assumption is realistic in large-scale Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks (UWSNs) composed of low-cost commodity sensors. periodic visits by the sink.) Previous work has demonstrated that sensor collaboration is an effective, yet expensive, means of attaining intrusion-resilience in UWSNs. In this paper, we explore intrusion resilience in Mobile UWSNs in the presence of a powerful mobile (literal)
Note
  • ISI Web of Science (WOS) (literal)
Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#affiliazioni
  • Department of Mathematics, Università di Roma Tre, Rome, Italy, CNR-ISTI, Pisa, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Computer Science Department, University of California, Irvine, USA (literal)
Titolo
  • Securing mobile unattended WSNs against a mobile adversary (literal)
Abstract
  • One important factor complicating security inWireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) is lack of inexpensive tamperresistant hardware in commodity sensors. Once an adversary compromises a sensor, all memory and forms of storage become exposed, along with all secrets. Thereafter, any cryptographic remedy ceases to be effective. Regaining sensor security after compromise (i.e., intrusion-resilience) is a formidable challenge. Prior approaches rely on either (1) the presence of an on-line trusted third party (sink), or (2) the availability of a True Random Number Generator (TRNG) on each sensor. Neither assumption is realistic in large-scale Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks (UWSNs) composed of low-cost commodity sensors. periodic visits by the sink.) Previous work has demonstrated that sensor collaboration is an effective, yet expensive, means of attaining intrusion-resilience in UWSNs. In this paper, we explore intrusion resilience in Mobile UWSNs in the presence of a powerful mobile (literal)
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