Shareholder Protection and the Cost of Capital Empirical Evidence from German and Italian Firms (Rapporti tecnici/preprint/working paper)

Type

• Rapporti tecnici/preprint/working paper (Classe)
• Prodotto della ricerca (Classe)

Label

• Shareholder Protection and the Cost of Capital Empirical Evidence from German and Italian Firms (Rapporti tecnici/preprint/working paper) (literal)

Anno

• 2006-01-01T00:00:00+01:00 (literal)

Alternative label

• Elston A., Rondi L. (2006)
  Shareholder Protection and the Cost of Capital Empirical Evidence from German and Italian Firms
  
  (literal)

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• Elston A., Rondi L. (literal)

Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#altreInformazioni

• Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 08/2006 (literal)

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• Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 08/2006 (literal)

Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#autoriCuratela

• Elston A., Rondi L. (literal)

Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#curatori

• Elston A., Rondi L. (literal)

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• Abstract: We investigate implications for the cost of capital in a model with agency conflicts between inside and outside shareholders, where the severity of agency costs depends on a parameter representing investor protection. Using firm-level data for Italy and Germany we find significant differences in shareholder protection and its implications for the firm’s ownership structure and the cost of capital. Results indicate that concentrated inside ownership increases the cost of capital for Italian firms while having no significant impact on the cost of capital for German firms. Evidence also suggests bank influence in Germany may serve to reduce investor risk for outside shareholders. In contrast, the magnitude of capital stock distortions is found to be quite important in Italy. Overall, slow growth in continental Europe may be more closely linked to institutional differences in shareholder protection between countries rather than inside ownership of firms. (literal)

Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#affiliazioni

• Rondi L.: Ceris-CNR Julie Ann Elston: Oregon State University, Bend, Usa and The Max Planck Institute for Economics, Jena, Germany (literal)

Titolo

• Shareholder Protection and the Cost of Capital Empirical Evidence from German and Italian Firms (literal)

Http://www.cnr.it/ontology/cnr/pubblicazioni.owl#tipoDiCuratela

• Periodico (literal)

Editore

• CNR-CERIS (Editore)

Prodotto di

• Imprese e Struttura Industriale (IC.P05.001.001) (Modulo)
• Research Institute on Sustainable Economic Growth (IRCRES) (Istituto)

Autore CNR

• LAURA RONDI (Unità di personale interno)

Incoming links:

Prodotto

• Research Institute on Sustainable Economic Growth (IRCRES) (Istituto)
• Imprese e Struttura Industriale (IC.P05.001.001) (Modulo)

Autore CNR di

• LAURA RONDI (Unità di personale interno)

Editore di

• CNR-CERIS (Editore)